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Abstract—Popular User-Review Social Networks (URSNs)—
such as Dianping, Yelp, and Amazon—are often the targets of
reputation attacks in which fake reviews are posted in order to
boost or diminish the ratings of listed products and services.
These attacks often emanate from a collection of accounts,
called Sybils, which are collectively managed by a group of
real users. A new advanced scheme, which we term elite Sybil
attacks, recruits organically highly-rated accounts to generate
seemingly-trustworthy and realistic-looking reviews. These elite
Sybil accounts taken together form a large-scale sparsely-knit
Sybil network for which existing Sybil fake-review defense
systems are unlikely to succeed.
In this paper, we conduct the first study to define, characterize,
and detect elite Sybil attacks. We show that contemporary elite
Sybil attacks have a hybrid architecture, with the first tier
recruiting elite Sybil workers and distributing tasks by Sybil
organizers, and with the second tier posting fake reviews for
profit by elite Sybil workers. We design ELSIEDET, a three-
stage Sybil detection scheme, which first separates out suspicious
groups of users, then identifies the campaign windows, and finally
identifies elite Sybil users participating in the campaigns. We
perform a large-scale empirical study on ten million reviews
from Dianping, by far the most popular URSN service in
China. Our results show that reviews from elite Sybil users are
more spread out temporally, craft more convincing reviews, and
have higher filter bypass rates. We also measure the impact
of Sybil campaigns on various industries (such as cinemas,
hotels, restaurants) as well as chain stores, and demonstrate that
monitoring elite Sybil users over time can provide valuable early
alerts against Sybil campaigns.
I. INTRODUCTION
User-Review Social Networks (URSNs)—such as Dianping,
Yelp, and Amazon—are often the targets of Sybil attacks,
where multiple fake accounts, called Sybils, are used to
generate fake reviews that masquerade as testimonials from
ordinary people. The goal of the attack is to deceive ordinary
users into making decisions favorable to the attackers. A
recent evolutionary trend is a new type of Sybil attack in
contemporary URSNs, which we call elite Sybil attacks. Elite
Sybil attacks recruit highly-rated users (e.g., “Elite” member
on Yelp or “5-star” member on Dianping) who normally post
genuine reviews, unbiased by financial incentives. Directed
by organizational leaders, elite Sybil attackers mimic the
behavior of real users by posting topically coherent content
with temporal patterns consistent with real users. Because
elite Sybil users’ review behavior greatly resembles that of
genuine users, elite Sybil attacks are extremely difficult to
algorithmically or manually detect. Therefore, new approaches
are needed to detect elite Sybil accounts rapidly and accurately.
Challenges. Previous work on defending against Sybil attacks
in Online Social Networks (OSNs) aims to identify fake or
compromised accounts mainly by two means: (i) investigating
an account’s social network connectivity [10, 21, 41, 49, 50]
relying on the trust that is established in existing social
connections between users; (ii) building machine learning
classifiers with a set of identified features [13, 35, 52]. The
literature on Sybil defense schemes mostly targets general
OSNs, and almost no reasons are tailored toward a situational
logic behind that attack, much less pay attention to Sybil
defenses in URSNs, such as Yelp and Dianping. URSNs
pose the following three unique challenges. (i) The nodes
in URSNs do not exhibit tight connectivity as in general
OSNs, rendering graph-connectivity based approaches less
effective in URSNs. (ii) Elite Sybil attacks in URSNs are more
professional, writing elaborate reviews and posting related
pictures to imitate real reviews. Thus, Sybil attacks in URSNs
are more difficult to detect than those in traditional OSNs. (iii)
Since elite Sybil attackers only contribute to a small fraction of
overall reviews, the existing Sybil detection approaches based
on the similarity of aggregate behavior do not work well. To
address all these challenges and deficiencies, a novel Sybil
detection technique for elite Sybil users is highly desired.
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ELSIEDET. In this work, we design a novel Elite Sybil
Detection system, ELSIEDET, which can identify URSN Sybil
users with elaborate camouflage. Different from previous
studies, we focus our design on Sybil campaigns that have
multiple Sybil workers colluding to perform a task (e.g., post-
ing positive reviews and high ratings for a specific restaurant)
under the coordination of a Sybil leader. These campaigns have
an active time period. Any user who posts during the active
time period is suspicious to be part of the campaign. This user
could either be a benign user who happens to visit the store
and post her review in the campaign period, or a Sybil user
who posts fake reviews specifically for the campaign. We build
ELSIEDET based on the following empirical observations: A
benign user posts honest reviews based on her real experience
while a Sybil user always posts fake reviews during the active
time period of the Sybil campaigns. Therefore, in the long run,
the more campaigns a user gets involved in, the more likely
she is a Sybil user.
ELSIEDET is designed with three stages: detecting a Sybil
community (Phase I), determining the Sybil campaign time
window (Phase II), and finally classifying elite Sybil users
(Phase III). In Phase I, since Sybil users collaborate to post
fake reviews in a Sybil campaign, ELSIEDET exploits this
group behavior to cluster users and identify Sybil communi-
ties. In Phase II, ELSIEDET uses a novel campaign detection
algorithm to automatically determine the start and end points
of a Sybil campaign, while ruling out reviews not belonging
to a Sybil task. Lastly, in Phase III, we propose a novel
elite Sybil detection algorithm to separate out elite Sybil
users from undetected users based on a new defined metric,
Sybilness, which scores the extent a user participates in the
Sybil campaign.
We implement ELSIEDET and evaluate its performance on
a large-scale dataset from Dianping, by far the most popular
URSN in China. Our dataset was crawled from January 1,
2014 to June 15, 2015 and includes 10, 541, 931 reviews,
32, 940 stores, and 3, 555, 154 users. We show that, of all
the reviews, more than 108, 100 reviews are fake reviews,
which were generated by 21, 871 regular Sybil users and
12, 292 elite Sybil users. These Sybil users belong to 566 Sybil
communities, which launched 2, 164 Sybil campaigns. Our
research shows that the current filtering system of Dianping
is ineffective at detecting fake reviews generated by the elite
Sybil users since less than 33.7% of the fake reviews have
been filtered by Dianping. Finally, through manual inspection,
we conclude that 90.7% of randomly sampled suspicious users
are elite Sybil users, and 93.8% of the 1, 000 most suspicious
users are elite Sybil users. We have reported all of our findings
to Dianping, which acknowledged our detection results.
Findings. Our study reveals the following main findings about
the operation logistics of elite Sybil attacks.
• Motivated by economic revenue on black markets (e.g.,
an elite Sybil user can receive up to 20 times more
income than a regular Sybil user for the same task),
elite Sybil users have developed a series of techniques to
evade the Sybil detection systems, including coordinating
the posting time and crafting carefully-polished review
contents and pictures.
• We evaluate the impact of Sybil attacks on different
categories of industry. Surprisingly, cinemas, hotels, and
restaurants are the most active in hiring Sybil users for
promotions. In particular, 30.2% of cinemas, 7.7% of
hotels, and 5.5% of restaurants are actively involved in
Sybil campaigns.
• We observe that 12.4% of Sybil communities post fake
reviews for chain stores, which is different from recent re-
search performed on Yelp [27]. What is more interesting
is that that overhyped chain stores with the same brand
recruit the same Sybil communities for Sybil campaigns.
• We find that more than 50% of Sybil campaigns can be
determined within the first two weeks by only observing
activities of elite Sybil users, thereby allowing the URSN
to defend against the attack while in progress.
Contributions. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the
first to study elite Sybil detection in URSNs. In summary, we
make the following key contributions:
1) We show that the Sybil organization of Dianping has
evolved to a hybrid architecture, rather than a prevalent
centralized or a simple distributed system [34, 45].
2) We identify a new type of Sybil users, elite Sybil
users, which employ a sophisticated strategy for evading
detection and have never been studied before.
3) We characterize the behaviors of elite Sybil users and
propose an early-warning system to detect online Sybil
campaigns.
4) We show that ELSIEDET complements the Dianping’s
current filtering system, which has been verified by both
our own manual inspection and the feedback received
from Dianping.
Roadmap. The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows: Section II introduces the necessary background on
Dianping and Sybil attacks while Section III defines elite Sybil
attacks. In Section IV, we propose our Sybil detection system.
Section V evaluates the experimental performance, whereas
Section VI provides detailed measurements of elite Sybil users
and Sybil communities. Section VII discusses applications and
limitations of the study. Section VIII surveys the related work.
Finally, Section IX concludes the paper.
A. Ethical Considerations
In this paper, we only collected publicly available review
information and its relation with stores on Dianping. We do not
crawl, store, or process users’ privacy information including
usernames, gender, small profile pictures, or tags that often
accompany the user profiles. Furthermore, we did not craft
fake reviews in order to ensure that our experiments do not
have a negative impact on Dianping’s services. Finally, we
have alerted Dianping about the discoveries and results made
in this paper. We are currently discussing possibilities of our
system deployment at Dianping.
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II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we first briefly describe Dianping. We then
summarize traditional Sybil attacks and the recent trend on
User-Review Social Networks (URSNs).
A. Dianping: A User-Review Social Network
Dianping is by far the most popular URSN in China, where
users can review local businesses such as restaurants, hotels,
and stores. When a user uses Dianping, Dianping will return
to the user with a list of choices in order of overall quality-
rating. The quality-rating of a restaurant review is typically
scaled from 1 star (worst) to 5 star (best), mainly depending
on the restaurant service. Users are also assigned star-ratings.
These star-ratings vary from 0 stars (rookie) to 6 stars (expert),
depending on the longevity of the user account, the number
of reviews posted, etc. A higher star-rating indicates that the
user is more experienced and more likely to be perceived as
an expert reviewer. Similar to “Elite User” on Yelp, a senior
level user (e.g., 4-star, 5-star, or 6-star user) is supposed to
be a small group of in-the-know users who have a large
impact on their local community. Dianping has established
its user reputation system that classifies user reviews into
“normal reviews” and “filtered reviews.” The latter includes
the uninformative reviews or the suspicious reviews that are
potentially manipulated by the Sybil attackers, but the details
of the algorithm remain unknown to the public.
B. Sybil Attacks
Social media platforms populated by millions of users
present either economic or political incentives to develop algo-
rithms to emulate and possibly alter human behavior. Earlier
Sybil attacks include malicious entities designed particularly
with the purpose to harm. These Sybil users mislead, exploit,
and manipulate social media discourse with rumors, spam,
malware, misinformation, slander, or even just noise [19, 20].
This type of abuse has also been observed during the 2016
US presidential election [2]. As better detection systems are
built, we witness an arms race similar to what we observed
for spam alike in the past. In recent years, Twitter Sybils
have become increasingly sophisticated, making their detec-
tion more difficult. For example, Sybils can post collected
material searched from websites at predetermined times, emu-
lating the human temporal signature of content production and
consumption [17]. In the meantime, the arms race has also
driven the corresponding countermeasures [7, 11, 13, 40].
The evolutionary chain of Sybil attacks imposes a novel
challenge in the most-up-to-date URSNs: They provide fake
content among little pieces of their information, regardless of
their accuracy, which is highly popular and endorsed by many
high-level organizers, exerting great impact against which
there are no effective countermeasures. In this paper, we
characterize and detect a new type of Sybil attacks in URSNs,
typically applying our methodology to Dianping as our case
study.
III. DISSECTING ELITE SYBIL ATTACKS
In this section, we first introduce some definitions. We
then define a novel type of Sybil attackers, coined as elite
Sybil users. We finally take an in-depth dive into the typical
hierarchical architecture and the key actors playing in a Sybil
organization.
A. Terminology
To formulate our problem precisely, we introduce the fol-
lowing definitions.
DEFINITION III.1. Store: A Store S has an official website
on Dianping that contains a large number of reviews of this
particular store.
DEFINITION III.2. Community: A Community C is a group of
users who post reviews in similar stores to rate and comment
such stores.
REMARK III.3. In our paper, we categorize all communities
into two types: benign communities and Sybil communities.
We define a benign community to be formulated by all benign
(real, normal) users and a Sybil community to be formulated
by all Sybil (malicious) users. A set of users is also partitioned
into two types: A benign user is a person who posts honest
reviews and a Sybil user is a person who posts fake reviews
to boost the prestige of stores. We will use the terms benign
users and real users interchangeably.
DEFINITION III.4. Campaign: A campaign—denoted as
(C, S, Ts, Te), where C, S, Ts, Te denote community ID, store
ID, starting time, and ending time of a campaign—is an
activity in which users of a Community C post reviews in
Store S from Ts to Te to boost the prestige of Store S.
REMARK III.5. For Sybil users in a given community, these
Sybil users serve for various stores. Each of these stores
has one particular campaign launched by this community.
However, these stores can have other campaigns, but are
launched by other communities.
B. Elite Sybil Users
In a Sybil organization of Dianping, we find a new type of
Sybil users, termed elite Sybil users. Different from regular
Sybil users studied before, elite Sybil users post reviews
not belonging to Sybil tasks, which can harm the accuracy
of existing detection systems to a large degree. Elite Sybil
accounts are mainly composed of two kinds of accounts:
either (i) Sybil accounts created reviews not belonging to
Sybil tasks (smoke-screening) in order to mimic genuine users
purely for the use of campaigns; or (ii) accounts owned by
benign users—usually with high-rating stars—that convert to
Sybil accounts when fulfilling a Sybil task within a campaign
in order to reap the rewards offered by Sybil organizations
(The Sybil task is detailed in Section III-C2.). Although
elite Sybil accounts belong to multiple users/entities, they are
manipulated by a single entity (i.e., Sybil leader). This satisfies
the definition of Sybil attack that a malicious entity takes on
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multiple identities. Therefore we consider the attack performed
by elite Sybil accounts as Sybil attack. By hiding behind
massive reasonable reviews posted however deliberately or
unwittingly, these reviews posted by elite Sybil users appear
realistic as those posted by benign users. Compared with
regular Sybil users, elite Sybil users are more active out of
the Sybil campaigns, which enables elite Sybil users to have
a much lower percentage of fake reviews in their posts and
higher user-level star-ratings (see Section VI).
Black market and economic factors. Here, we try to explore
the monetary reward for an elite Sybil user on Dianping.
Table I shows hierarchical rewards for a specific Sybil or-
ganization into which we infiltrated recently. We see that
the rewards depend on the ratings of Sybil accounts. Not
surprisingly, the monetary rewards earned by each submission
increase as the ratings of accounts increase. This is largely
because users with higher ratings have a larger influence,
their reviews are less likely to be deleted, and thus are more
attractive to Sybil organizers. Likewise, the reviews from the
highly-ranked users are more influential, and have a larger
chance of being presented in the front page of a store, which
can potentially attract more attention from customers.
TABLE I
HIERARCHICAL REWARDS FOR (ELITE) SYBIL WORKERS
Ratings of Accounts Rewards per Submission
0-star, 1-star $0.30
2-star $0.75
3-star $1.50
4-star $3.74
5-star, 6-star $5.98
C. Anatomy of Elite Sybil Attack Operations
Many review websites are suffering from review manipula-
tion, which can be seen as a variant of Sybil attacks in URSNs.
Similar to Yelp and TripAdvisor, Dianping is struggling with
review manipulation as well. To investigate these organizations
in depth, we impersonated Sybil users in order to investigate
how the tasks are distributed and executed by the Sybil
organizer. Note that, for the ethical considerations, we did
not perform any real tasks in reality. In most cases, Sybil
leaders regularly post contact information on social media
(e.g., Tencent QQ, WeChat, and Douban Group1) to attract
Sybil workers. Specifically, we acquired contact information
from Douban Group to reach out many Sybil organizations.
During our month-long investigation, we found that the Sybil
attacks on Dianping show a unique organization pattern.
1) A Hybrid Architecture: Sybil organizations usually show
either a centralized or distributed architecture on Facebook or
Twitter. The Sybil organization on Dianping, however, evolves
to a hybrid architecture, which involves four key actors, as
shown in Figure 1:
1Douban Group, being part of Douban, is composed of huge numbers of sub
forums for users to post messages under various topics. https://www.douban.
com/group
Customers
(Overhyped Stores)
Agents
Leader Leader Leader
Workers Regular Sybil Account
Elite Sybil Account
Fig. 1. The architecture of a Sybil organization
1) Customers (or Overhyped stores): Businesses that want
to boost their scores rapidly on Dianping. Overhyped
stores propose mission description and monetary re-
wards for a Sybil organization to launch Sybil cam-
paigns. They are beneficiaries from Sybil campaigns.
2) Agents: Organizers are agents who are responsible for
accepting the tasks from overhyped stores and upper
management of a Sybil organization. Organizers take
charge of launching the Sybil campaigns.
3) Leaders: Leaders take charge of recruiting Sybil workers
and make arrangements for crafting reviews. Leaders
distribute tasks to Sybil workers and payment.
4) Elite Sybil workers: Elite Sybil workers are Internet
users, recruited by leaders, who post fake reviews for
profit. These elite Sybil accounts are then manipulated
by elite Sybil workers to post fake reviews. (Elite Sybil
accounts, users, and workers are interchangeable in this
paper.)
In this architecture, the leader plays a key role in task
distribution and quality control of review comments for the
following reasons: First, the leader himself/herself controls
a certain number of Sybil accounts, and these facilitate the
launch of a campaign. Second, to increase the impact of
a campaign, the leader can also outsource a task to many
elite Sybil workers, especially highly-ranked Dianping users.
Finally, the leader actively participates in the review gen-
eration by directly generating the high-quality reviews by
himself/herself or by closely supervising the review generation
of workers. In summary, if elite Sybil workers are the puppets,
then Sybil leaders are the masters who locally dominate the
unique workflow of Sybil organizations on Dianping.
2) Typical Workflow: Each Sybil campaign is centered on
a collection of tasks. For example, a campaign launched by
an organization entails crafting positive fake reviews for a
restaurant to boost ratings on Dianping. In this case, the owner
of the overhyped store sets up the objects of a Sybil campaign,
and the task is further distributed from organizers to Sybils.
Each task would be “posting a single (fake) positive review
online.” Sybils who complete a task generate submissions
that include screenshots of the fake reviews to be posted
as evidence of his/her work (see Figure 2). The overhyped
stores/agents can then verify if the work has been done to
their satisfaction. It is important to notice that not all tasks
can be completed because of some low-quality submissions.
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Fig. 2. An example of a fake review
The key feature of a Sybil organization on Dianping is that
the Sybil leader is actively involved in the Sybil tasks. In
particular, when receiving a task from the customer, a Sybil
leader distributes this task to multiple elite Sybil workers and
guides review generation, which is illustrated in step (1) in
Figure 3.
• Leader-supervised model: In this model, the reviews are
created by an elite Sybil worker (step 2.1) and the gen-
erated content and posting time must follow the leader’s
guidance and must be approved by the said leader (step
2.2).
• Leader hands-on model: In this model, it is the leader
or the customer that generates the review comments first.
The generated reviews are normally high-quality com-
ments that include both favored comments and pictures
of food or the store (step 2).
Given a certain review, the worker posts fake reviews of the
specified stores (step 3). The leader will check if these crafted
fake reviews exist for a period of 3 to 7 days (step 4). Once
the existence of fake reviews is confirmed, the leader will pay
the elite Sybil worker (step 5).
Fig. 3. The process to post fake reviews
Through our investigation, we find that cultivating a 3-star
elite Sybil account endorsing a tutorial offered by a Sybil orga-
nizer is priced at $6 per account. The tutorial provides details
about the approach to boosting ratings of Sybil accounts and
mimicking benign accounts. In concrete, (i) once an account
is activated, its profile information, such as gender, date of
birth, address, and profile picture, needs editing to the require-
ments of the tutorial. (ii) Before participating in the Sybil
organization, a great number of reasonable reviews are also
required to cultivate an elite Sybil account. Specially, through
our sting operation in a Sybil organization on Taobao,2 the
2https://www.taobao.com/
largest C2C website in China, we find that an overhyped store,
through several Sybil organizers, have collected approximately
100, 000 elite Sybil accounts. For the Sybil organization we
have infiltrated, we observed 30 tasks which were assigned
in three months. For a particular task, the store exploits some
of these elite Sybil accounts to generate 500 fake positive
reviews at the cost of around $3,000 in total. Moreover, the
Sybil organization we participated in also provides an after-
sales guarantee, meaning if fake reviews are deleted, it will
launch a second-round elite Sybil attack. In addition, we also
observe that rewards per submission on Dianping are many
more than those on other Chinese websites, such as ZBJ and
SDH [45]. The high monetary rewards incentivize the Sybil
agents or leaders to develop sophisticated pyramid schemes to
evade detection.
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that automatic
detection of elite Sybil users is important to prevent Sybil
attacks from URSNs. This motivated us to develop a novel
framework of Sybil detection.
IV. ELSIEDET: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we will present three components of
ELSIEDET (see Figure 4): detecting Sybil communities, de-
termining campaign time windows, and detecting elite Sybil
users.
A. System Overview
ELSIEDET is a three-tier Sybil detection system. In Phase I,
we cluster communities based on collusion networks and per-
form a binary classification on detected-communities, echoing
that a large number of fake reviews are usually posted by
the Sybil community under the guidance of the Sybil leaders.
In this phase, regular Sybil users will be clustered in Sybil
communities, but most elite Sybil users are able to evade
community clustering by covering up their collusion.
In Phase II, we extract time windows of Sybil campaigns
from labeled Sybil communities. The rational behind the
design is that a Sybil campaign has an active time period.
A user posting a review towards the target store during the
active time period is considered as a campaign-involved user.
This user could be either a benign user who happens to visit
the store and posts her reviews at that time or a Sybil user
who posts fake reviews for the campaign benefits. We observe
that a benign user posts reviews based on her real experience
while a Sybil user always posts reviews during the active time
period of the Sybil campaigns.
In Phase III, followed by the undetected users and corre-
sponding extracted Sybil campaign time windows, we first
use the participation rate between users and communities
to characterize the extent to which a user is related to a
community; then we leverage a novel metric to determine
elite Sybil users. The rationale behind the elite Sybil detection
algorithm is that, through using elaborate reviews to obfuscate
their fake reviews, the elite Sybil users are motivated to
participate in multiple Sybil campaigns due to a high economic
5
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Fig. 4. System overview
rewarding. Therefore, the more campaigns a user participates
in, the more likely the user is an elite Sybil user.
B. Sybil Community Detection
In this section, we present the details of detecting the Sybil
community. The first step of Sybil community detection is
constructing the Sybil social links for the Sybil users belonging
to the same Sybil community. It is defined that two users
belonging to the same community have a Sybil social link
if they have collusive reviews, which are similar reviews
posted by two users according to the same store. Based on
these virtual links, we further define a novel metric, pairwise
similarity metrics, which measure the similarity among the
users. Then, we adopt the Louvain method [6] to extract
communities from the entire network. Finally, we perform
classification to identify the Sybil community from the benign
community.
1) Constructing Sybil Social Links via Collusive Reviews:
To cluster and identify the Sybil community, the first step is
to build the social links between the Sybil users, which are
coined as Sybil social links. In general, two users belonging to
the same community and having the collusive reviews posted
in the same store or restaurant are defined to have a Sybil
social link. Specifically, a tuple abstraction of a user’s single
review is referred to as (U, T, S, L), where U , T , S, and L
represent user ID, review timestamp, store ID, and star-rating
of a review, respectively. For users u and v, we derive review
sets associated with u and v, respectively:
R(u) = {(U, T1, S1, L1), (U, T2, S2, L2), · · · , (U, Tn, Sn, Ln)};
R(v) = {(V, T ′1, S′1, L′1), (V, T ′2, S′2, L′2), · · · , (V, T ′m, S′m, L′m)}.
For all pairwise users u and v, and for a given k,
(U, Tk, Sk, Lk) ∈ R(u), we define Pu(k) = 1 if there exists
(V, T ′l , S
′
l , L
′
l) ∈ R(v) such that the following three properties
are true:
1) The two reviews are posted in the same store: Sk = S′l ;
2) The two reviews are created within a fixed time slot ∆T :
|Tk − T ′l | ≤ ∆T ;
3) Both two reviews are 1-star or both of them are 5-star:
Lk = L
′
l = 1-star or Lk = L
′
l = 5-star.
Otherwise, Pu(k) = 0.
Note that in previous research [11], Cao et al. simply
defined two collusive reviews if they pertain to the same
constraint object and their timestamps fall into the same fixed
time slot, but these two collusive reviews defined are not
mathematically equivalent.
Measuring similarity is key to grouping similar users.
Different from the previous research [11, 40] using Jaccard
similarity metric, we measure the similarity between pairwise
users u and v as follows:
Sim(u, v) =
n∑
k=1
Pu(k) +
m∑
l=1
Pv(l)
|R(u)|+ |R(v)|
=
n∑
k=1
Pu(k) +
m∑
l=1
Pv(l)
n+m
.
(1)
Note: Sim(u, v) = Sim(v, u).
In summary, we model an Sybil community as an undirected
weighted graph G = (V, E), where each node u ∈ V is an user
account and each edge (u, v) ∈ E represents a Sybil social link
among users u and v if and only if Sim(u, v) > βThre.3 Then
users u and v are defined as neighbors.
2) Community Clustering via the Louvain Method: We
then employ a community detection method, termed Louvain
method [6], to detect communities on Sybil social links.
The Louvain community detection method iteratively groups
closely-connected communities together to improve the par-
tition modularity. In each iteration, every node represents a
community, and well-connected neighbor nodes are combined
into the same community. The graph is reconstructed at the
end of each iteration by converting the resulting communities
to nodes and adding links that are weighted by the inter-
community connectivity. The entire process is repeated itera-
tively until it reaches the maximum modularity. Each iteration
has a computational cost linear to the number of edges in the
corresponding graph and typically the process just requires a
small number of iterations.
It is noted that community detection algorithms have been
proposed to directly detect Sybils [41]. They seek a partition
of a graph that has dense intra-community connectivity and
weak inter-community connectivity. For example, the Louvain
method searches for a partition with high modularity [6]. How-
ever, we find that it is insufficient to uncover massive Sybil
users within Louvain-detected communities. In the follow-
ing step, we apply supervised machine learning to Louvain-
detected communities.
3The threshold βThre is tuned to optimize the following community clas-
sification in terms of accuracy. Community classification results obtained by
multiple supervised learning techniques are not overly-sensitive to the different
thresholds chosen.
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3) Sybil Community Classification: Next, we apply ma-
chine learning classifiers to discriminate Sybil communities
from benign ones. The reason behind this is that some com-
munities contain users who reside close-together or visit the
same venues. To accurately characterize these observations,
we apply eight features with respect to three types (tabulated
in Table II) to our binary classifiers. The output is each
community labeled either benign or Sybil. We validate this
intermediate step in Section V-B.
TABLE II
TYPES OF FEATURES
Types of Features Features
Community-based Features
Score deviation, Average number of reviews,
Entropy of the number of reviews in each chain
stores, Entropy of districts of stores
Network Features Average similarity,Global clustering coefficient
User-based Features Unique reviews ratio,Maximum number of duplication
(a) Community-based features. There are four types of
Community-based features: score deviation, reviews per store,
entropy of chain stores, and entropy of districts of stores. Score
deviation and Average number of reviews are self-explanatory.
To achieve the Sybil tasks, score deviation of reviews posted
by Sybil users will become larger. Entropy of the number
of reviews in each chain stores is the expected value of
information contained in each of the chain stores by measuring
the number of reviews occurred. We use this feature because
some Sybil users post reviews only in chain stores. Entropy
of districts of stores is a location-based feature to characterize
mobility patterns of Sybil users that are driven by Sybil tasks.
We therefore use Entropy of districts of stores to show this
difference.
(b) Similarity-based network features. We redefine the
network via Sybil social community construction since be-
nign and Sybil communities have remarkable differences with
respect to the graph structure (see Figure 5(a) and Fig-
ure 5(b)). We use Average similarity and Global clustering
coefficient to show the difference according to the redefined
graph structures. Average similarity is the average similarity
between pairwise users in a community. Sybil users in a Sybil
community are assigned tasks for similar stores, but users in
a benign community randomly choose stores to post reviews.
Hence, similarity values between Sybil users are greater than
those between benign users. Global clustering coefficient is
used to measure the degree in which nodes in a graph tend to
cluster together. Sybil users have the characteristics of team
working, so they are more likely to be clustered together.
(c) User-based features. Since community-based features may
lose information of users, we then abstract the user-based
features of each user and aggregate them as a feature of the
community. By analyzing Sybil communities, we observe that
some Sybil users will repeatedly post reviews in the same
store. We therefore define two features, Unique reviews ratio
and Maximum number of duplication, to reflect this user-
level behavior. Lastly, we do not use linguistic or contextual
(a) Graph structure of a benign
community (community 7914)
(b) Graph structure of a Sybil com-
munity 7924 (community 7924)
Fig. 5. Comparison of the graph structure between a benign community and
a Sybil community
features because these features are not so effective in the
URSN setting [30].
C. Campaign Window Detection
To detect the time window of a Sybil campaign, one
potential approach is detecting sudden increases in rating,
ratio of singleton reviews, and the number of reviews by
leveraging a burst detection algorithm (e.g., Bayesian change
point detection algorithm [15]). However, on Dianping, Sybil
campaign detection results based on burst detection may not
be reliable in practice. For example, the sudden increases in
ratings or the number of reviews may be contributed by some
unexpected factors such as offline promotions. An observation
is that a store tends to entice its customers to write favorable
reviews as the return of a discount coupon in promotion
seasons.
Different from the previous research, our proposed solution
focuses on detecting the anomaly collaborative behaviors of
Sybil community. We interpret the algorithm of campaign
window detection in the following. The Algorithm 1 takes
as input a list Lreview that represents the number of reviews
posted each week and does the following:
1) Initializes the start and end points of the campaign
window (Line 1 through Line 2).
2) Iteratively finds and deletes sparse review intervals
within the campaign window (Line 3 through Line 14).
a) Finds the first left and right sparse review intervals
within the campaign window. If none, the functions
will return the entire campaign window (Line 4
through Line 5).
b) If there is no sparse review interval on either side,
breaks the loop (Line 6 through Line 8).
c) Removes the sparse review interval. This can pre-
vent deleting major parts of the campaign window
(Line 9 through Line 13).
The output of Algorithm 1 is the start point and the end point
of each Sybil campaign accordingly.
As shown in Figure 6, it is observed that a campaign period
is comprised of multiple segment periods. We are interested
in those segment periods in which the Sybil users are active
and thus we need to filter out those periods when the Sybil
users are inactive. To achieve this, we introduce the concept
of Sparse Review Interval, which is used to indicate whether
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ALGORITHM 1: Detecting Campaign Time Windows
Input: A list Lreview whose item Lreview [i] denotes the number of reviews posted in
the ith week.
Output: The start point l and end point r of the campaign time window.
Initial:
1: l ← 0;
2: r ← length(Lreview )− 1;
3: while (true) do
4: Il,l′ ← find(left, l); {Find the first sparse interval Il,l′ from left.}
5: Ir′,r ← find(right, r); {Find the first sparse interval Ir′,r from right.}
6: if (l′ = r and r ′ = l) then {There is no sparse interval.}
7: break;
8: end if
9: if (|Il,l′ | ≤ |Ir′,r |) then {Choose the interval with fewer reviews.}
10: l ← l′ + 1;
11: else
12: r ← r ′ − 1;
13: end if
14: end while
15: return l, r ;
Fig. 6. An example of campaign time window detection
or not the users are active in this time period. In particular, a
sparse review interval Ii,j (where i represents the start point
of the ith week and j represents the end point of the jth week)
is referred to as the period in which the number of weeks with
at least one review is less than the number of weeks without
any reviews. As shown in Figure 6, with a long time period,
the entire time interval can be seen as a sparse review interval.
In order to avoid removing intervals with massive reviews, our
strategy is scanning the time period from both left and right
to find the first sparse review intervals respectively, and then
removing the sparse review interval with fewer reviews. We
repeat this process until there is no sparse review interval and
the remaining period is the targeted campaign period.
D. Elite Sybil User Detection
Recall that elite Sybil users are those who often post reviews
not belonging to Sybil tasks like a benign user but occasionally
post fake reviews. The primary reason that the existing Sybil
detection approaches cannot effectively detect elite Sybil users
is that reviews not belonging to Sybil tasks decrease the
similarity between elite Sybil users. Labeling all reviews of
an elite Sybil user as fake reviews may misjudge some real
reviews, which will take away the enjoyment of the service.
In order to detect elite Sybil users, we take as input the time
windows of Sybil campaigns and corresponding undetected
users. Then we define the participation rate and Sybilness that
is the perceived likelihood to output an elite Sybil user. Finally
we use Sybilness to quantify each review.
Participation rate between users and communities. We
first define participation rate between users and communities
to characterize the extent to which a user is related to a
community. Based on our observations, we assume that the
more campaigns a user participates in, the more likely the
user is an elite Sybil user. Given a community C, we define:
• NC(k): the accumulated number of reviews posted within
the kth time window of community C.
• NmaxC : the maximum number of reviews posted within
all time windows of community C.
We then “normalize” the number of reviews in the kth time
window by PC(k) =
NC(k)
Nmax
C
, for a given C. PC(k) will help
indicate the importance of a time window, since the larger the
number of reviews is within a time window, the more active
this campaign is in the community. Then for a given user u
in community C, we can calculate the “weighted sum” of the
number of reviews u posts by:
Nu∈C =
∑
k
PC(k) ·Nu∈C(k), (2)
where Nu∈C(k) represents the number of reviews u posted
within the kth time window of C. We finally plug Nu∈C into
a standard sigmoid function to measure the participation rate
ρu∈C between u and C:
ρu∈C =
1
1 + exp
−Nu∈C−µC
σC
, for any u ∈ C, (3)
where µC and σC are the mean and the variance of Nu∈C for
all users u in C.
Sybilness. Sybilness score is a perceived likelihood indicating
if a user is an elite Sybil user. Since simultaneously partici-
pating in multiple communities leads to the large cardinality
of C but small Nu∈C and ρu∈C , just considering about the
participation rate ρu∈C will fail to tease out elite Sybil users.
We then take ρu∈C into consideration to construct the final
index, Sybilness, to determine a specific user’s legitimacy. To
be specific, for assigning a Sybilness score f to each user u
on Dianping, we take a weighted average method on Nu∈C
with respect to each of the corresponding coefficients ρu∈C ,
for all C, as shown below:
f(u) =
∑
C
ρu∈C ·Nu∈C . (4)
Eventually, we use the Sybilness score f(·) to determine the
perceived likelihood that a user is an elite Sybil user or not
(Note: Sybilness score here can be greater than 1.).
Annotating reviews posted by elite Sybil users. Since not
all reviews posted by elite Sybil Users are fake, we annotate
each reviews with a score defined as ρu∈C ·PC(k), for any k.
This score can be used as a criterion to filter fake reviews or
regulate the frequency of CAPTHCHAs.
V. EVALUATION
We implement ELSIEDET and evaluate it on a large-scale
dataset of Dianping. Our evaluation covers the following
aspects: Sybil community detection, elite Sybil user detection,
and system performance.
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A. Data Collection
In this section, we will introduce the datasets used and
propose the methodology we use to gain the ground-truth data.
TABLE III
BREAKDOWNS OF STORES
Type # Stores # OverhypedStores
Percentage of
Overhyped Stores
Cinema 235 71 30.21%
Hotel 1,738 134 7.71%
Restaurant 22,474 1,244 5.54%
Entertainment 1,384 73 5.27%
Wedding Service 320 8 2.50%
Beauty Store 1,460 35 2.40%
Fitness Center 326 7 2.15%
Living Service 863 10 1.16%
Scenic Spots 1,243 14 1.13%
Shopping 2,466 22 0.89%
Infant Service 216 0 0%
Car 148 0 0%
Decoration Company 67 0 0%
Dataset. We develop a Python-based crawler to analyze
HTML structure of store pages and user pages on Dianping.
All reviews were crawled by the web crawler from January
1, 2014 to June 15, 2015. Starting from the four hand-picked
overhyped stores (the seed list) in the training set belonging
to the same Sybil organization, which we discovered during
our month-long investigation. We then crawled outwards—
crawling one level down of all users who wrote reviews in
these stores and extended the store list that was commented
by these users. Second, we crawled all reviews appearing in
these stores and collected all users of these reviews to form a
user list. The web crawler repeated these steps until reaching
32, 940 stores on the store list. Eventually, our resulting data
set has 10, 541, 931 reviews, 32, 933 stores, and 3, 555, 154
users. We will make all of our data used publicly available in
the future. Furthermore, we categorize the stores crawled into
13 types (see breakdowns in Table III). In Table III, the 13 cat-
egories are shown in decreasing order in terms of percentage
of overhyped stores. Followed by our detection methodology,
surprisingly, we find that more than 30% overhyped stores are
pertinent to cinemas. The main remaining overhyped stores
are hotels, restaurants, and places of entertainment.
Ground-truth dataset. Similar to the previous research [13,
29, 40], we rely on manually labeled data for Sybil community
detection. In order to classify the communities as benign or
Sybil using supervised learning, a subset of the communities
needs to be labeled. To carry out the labeling, we actively
exchanged ideas with Dianping of how high-profile Sybil users
resemble. Particularly, the final manual labeling considers the
following three criteria. If two of them are satisfied, then a
community is labeled as a Sybil community.
(a) Massive filtered reviews by Dianping signify that a large
proportion of reviews posted in a community are filtered by
Dianping’s Sybil detection system. Reviews that Dianping has
classified as illegitimate using a combination of algorithmic
techniques, simple heuristics, and human expertise. Filtered
reviews are not published on Dainping’s store/user pages. If
we find a great proportion of reviews existing in our dataset but
missing on Dianping’s main listings, this indicates that these
reviews have been filtered. Although a review can be filtered
for many reasons, such as overly-florid or low-quality reviews,
filtered reviews are, of course, partial indicators of being Sybil.
If massive reviews have been filtered in a community, then the
community has a high possibility to be Sybil.
(b) Duplicate user reviews mean that reviews posted by a
user belonging to a community only serve one or two store(s)
with similar content. To our observation, reviews posted by
a benign user of a community are often evenly distributed
in miscellaneous stores. The existence of duplication signifies
that Sybil users are more addicted to boosting review ratings
in only a few stores in a community. This feature is stricter
than the collusive reviews defined in this paper.
(c) Spatio-temporal review pattern means that an unusual
sudden jump with respect to the number of reviews of a target
restaurant/store in a community is consistent with a collusive
action of the Sybil community, by rule of thumb. Normally,
the reviews of a store are evenly distributed since its inception.
Hence, if many stores appearing in a community demonstrate
unreasonable spatio-temporal patterns, then the community is
highly likely to be Sybil.
To do this, we did not hire Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) to accomplish the tasks because scrutinizing those
reviews requires deep familiarity with Chinese language and
the Dianping platform per se. Instead, we hired 5 Chinese un-
dergraduate students to classify communities as either benign
or Sybil. For the rare cases where there was not a consensus,
we used voting. For example, a community would be labeled
as Sybil if and only if the 5 votes are SSSBB, SSSSB or
SSSSS, with S representing Sybil and B representing benign.
B. Results and Detection Accuracy
Accuracy of Sybil community detection. For the dataset
used, ELSIEDET detects in total 710 communities. By using
the multiple criteria shown above, we randomly picked up 170
communities as ground truth and labeled 117 Sybil communi-
ties as well as 53 benign communities. The assumption that a
community only takes a binary classification can be justified
by the empirical percentage of Sybil (resp. benign) users
taking up in the designated Sybil (resp. benign) communities.
To justify this, we took a look at each of the 1, 969 users
of 74 communities (54 Sybil vs. 20 benign) obtained from
ground truth (which is more than 10% of the total amount of
communities), still by following the above criteria to check
each user in communities. We conclude that 96.85% of the
users are designated to the correct community labels. With
8 features tabulated in Table II, we also compare several
classifiers implemented by scikit-learn library [1]. We perform
grid search to determine optimal parameters for each clas-
sifier and evaluate their performance on weighted precision,
weighted recall, weighted F1 score, and AUC (Area under
the Curve of ROC) using 5-fold cross-validation. As shown in
Table IV, support vector machine (SVM) performs best among
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Fig. 7. Comparison between benign and Sybil communities by percentage of
filtered reviews
all classifiers with 96.45% F1 score and 99.42% AUC, using
Gaussian (RBF) kernel with parameters chosen C = 18 and
γ = 0.09.
TABLE IV
CLASSIFICATION PERFORMANCE
Classifier Precision Recall F1 AUC
Decision tree 93.80% 92.90% 93.60% 92.83%
SVM 96.74% 96.47% 96.45% 99.42%
GNB 94.21% 93.44% 93.57% 97.64%
KNN 96.75% 96.47% 96.50% 97.45%
Ada boost 93.84% 93.54% 93.60% 97.92%
Random forest 93.16% 94.01% 92.99% 97.42%
We then apply our trained classifiers to predict each commu-
nity. As a result, ELSIEDET identifies 566 Sybil communities
with 22, 324 users, and 144 benign communities with 5, 222
users. Surprisingly, detected Sybil communities significantly
outnumber detected benign communities. It is perhaps because
in the community clustering process, the constraints of posting
time and review ratings pose limitations on forming benign
communities. Most benign users are thereby pruned by apply-
ing the Louvain method.
Recall in Section II-A, we note that not all filtered re-
views are fake reviews (some are viewed as useless reviews).
Through our experiments, we confirm that the fake reviews
classified are more likely to be filtered. As shown in Figure 7,
we compare the percentage of filtered reviews in benign and
Sybil communities, respectively. We observe that the per-
centage of filtered reviews of Sybil communities significantly
outweighs that of benign communities with respect to the
same cumulative probability. Specifically, we see that 80% of
Sybil communities (resp. benign communities) have more than
80% (resp. less than 50%) of reviews filtered. We conclude
that filtered reviews are more likely fake, which validates the
accuracy of our detection methodology.
Accuracy of elite Sybil users detection. ELSIEDET considers
a user u as an elite Sybil user if the following two conditions
hold: (i) if the user u does not belong to any community;
and (ii) the user participation rate ρu∈C is larger than 0.5
(that is, the average participation rate of users in commu-
nity C), for any community C. According to this criterion,
we label 12, 292 elite Sybil users in total. Instead of binary
classification, ELSIEDET ranks elite Sybil users according to
the Sybilness score function (see Equation (4)).
To carry out the ultimate validation on elite Sybil users
detected from ELSIEDET, we rely on human knowledge. In
concrete, for each detected elite Sybil user, we manually
categorize his or her reviews into two types, suspicious
reviews and normal reviews, by inspecting Sybil campaign
time intervals. The manual check then considers the following
three criteria (by rule of thumb): (i) this user is involved in
vast Sybil campaigns; (ii) the intent of suspicious reviews is
aligned with that of Sybil campaigns. For example, in order to
boost reputation in a Sybil campaign, the suspicious reviews
should be 5-star; (iii) suspicious reviews set apart from normal
reviews in terms of spatio-temporal characteristics. If a user
satisfies all three criteria, we validate that he or she is an elite
Sybil user. We emphasize that the criteria of manual validation
are stricter than holding the two conditions carried out by
ELSIEDET.
Finally, of all the top 1, 000 suspicious elite Sybil users that
our system flags, through manual validation, we conclude that
938 are indeed elite Sybil users, which leads to a precision rate
of 93.8%. We also randomly sampled 1, 000 flagged users to
generalize the validation results, which also leads to a high
precision rate of 90.7%.
C. System Performance
We evaluate the efficiency of ELSIEDET in a server with
Intel CPU E3-1220 v3 @ 3.10GHz and 16G memory. Since
ELSIEDET has to compute potential collusion set and the
pairwise similarity between potential collusive users to con-
struct Sybil social links, this step would be the bottleneck of
efficiency. Instead, we implement a parallel program for this
step based on the observation that the computation for each
user is independent. Finally, we implement a single-threaded
program to complete following steps. Specially, for Dianping’s
dataset, the step of computing the pairwise similarity takes
approximately 110 minutes and the remaining steps take
approximately 22 minutes.
VI. MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the behavior of elite Sybil users
and communities. First, we compare the behavior patterns
among benign users, regular Sybil users, and elite Sybil users.
We then discuss the relation between Sybil communities and
elite Sybil users and review manipulation in chain stores.
We study reviews, not belonging to Sybil tasks, posted by
elite Sybil users to speculate their strategies to camouflage
fake reviews. Finally, we demonstrate two temporal dynamics
characterized by user posting period and Sybil campaign
duration.
A. Comparison with Regular Sybil Users
Here, we try to explore the distribution of different types of
user levels. Figure 9 shows that the distribution of levels of
users is unevenly distributed for each type of users. As we can
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(a) Comparison on the number of fake reviews (b) Comparison on the percentage of fake reviews (c) Comparison on percentage of filtered reviews
Fig. 8. Comparison between elite Sybil users and regular Sybil users
Fig. 9. Comparison on distribution of user-level star ratings
see from Figure 9, we find that the distribution of levels of
benign users is almost symmetrically bell-shaped, centered at
3-star. In contrast, the levels of regular Sybil users are heavily
skewed toward low-level. Based on our results, we observe
that the levels of elite Sybil users detected are biased more
toward high-level than those of regular Sybil users.
Comparing elite Sybil users with regular Sybil users at
the micro level, we show that elite Sybil users post more
fake reviews, are more spread out temporally, and have fewer
reviews filtered by Dianping. Figure 8 compares the behavioral
patterns among elite Sybil users, regular Sybil users, and
benign users on Dianping.
Figure 8(a) plots the CDF of the number of users in terms
of the number of suspicious reviews posted. As can be seen
in Figure 8(a), elite Sybil users post the most suspicious
reviews among all. This demonstrates that elite Sybil users
cater to market demand due to their potential larger impact on
Dianping ranking and higher prices for the customers. For the
regular Sybil users, their strategy is frequently changing their
low-level accounts to evade the detection since it is easy to
apply or buy with a low cost for low-level accounts.
Figure 8(b) plots the CDF of the number of users in terms
of the percentage of fake reviews posted. As we can see, fake
reviews are significantly more often generated by regular Sybil
users than by elite Sybil users, which echoes our definition that
elite Sybil users post massive reviews not belonging to Sybil
tasks (smoke-screening) to mimic genuine users. Surprisingly,
the distribution of regular Sybil users roughly follows the
Pareto principle (also known as the 80-20 rule) that more than
60% of all the reviews posted by 20% of regular Sybil users
are fake. In contrast, as we can see from Figure 8(b), we show
that only 20% of all the reviews posted by more than 80% of
elite Sybil users are fake, recognizing that the principle also
applies in reverse.
Figure 8(c) plots the CDF of the number of users in terms
of their percentage of filtered reviews. As can be seen from
Figure 8(c), we show that the percentage of filtered reviews
of regular Sybil users significantly outnumbers that of benign
users with respect to the same cumulative probability. To be
specific, we see that 80% of Sybil users (resp. benign users)
have more than 90% (resp. less than 20%) of reviews filtered.
This user-level observation is consistent with the community-
level results shown in Figure 7. In addition, elite Sybil users
have fewer reviews filtered by Dianping mainly because a large
portion of their reviews are not assigned to any task.
B. Community Structure
Understanding the behaviors of elite Sybil users is im-
portant to reveal the characteristics of the (quasi) permanent
workforce of Sybil organizations on Dianping. Looking at the
macro level, communities of elite Sybil users form large-scale
sparsely knit networks and their graph density is much lower.
Fig. 10. Relation between elite Sybil users and communities
Figure 10 shows an example of an induced network structure
of elite Sybil users. In the figure, a dot represents an elite
Sybil user, a square represents a Sybil community, an edge
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between a dot and a square represents that an elite Sybil
user belongs to a community, and a red (resp. blue) dot
shows that an elite Sybil user belongs to a single community
(resp. multiple communities). As can be seen, we observe
that many elite Sybil users are correspondingly connected
to a single community, forming a large-scale sparsely knit
network. We also show that some elite Sybil users appear
in multiple communities. Ranked by Sybilness, we pick up
the top 1, 000 elite Sybil users out of all 12, 292 users in our
collection. There are 824 elite Sybil users who participated in a
single community, 160 who participated in two communities,
and 16 who participated in at least three communities. Not
surprisingly, we clearly show that these elite Sybil users are
sparsely connected and their graph density is much lower than
that of regular Sybil users.
C. Review Manipulation for Chain Stores
Recent research from Harvard [27] pointed out that it is
less likely for chain stores to hire Sybil accounts to generate
favorable reviews. Chain stores tend to depend heavily on
various forms of promotion and branding to establish their
reputation. This is because chains receive less benefit from
reviews, and they may also incur a larger cost if they are caught
posting fake reviews, destroying their brand image. However,
our research contradicts this statement. We find that a series of
chain stores leverage Sybil organizations to post fake reviews
to manipulate their online ratings.
To be more specific, of all 566 Sybil communities in our
dataset, it is observed that 12.37% of Sybil communities post
fake reviews for chain stores listed on Dianping. The number
of chain stores involved varies from 2 to 11. One possible
explanation is that the chain stores hired the same Sybil agent,
who recruited the same Sybil community for Sybil campaigns.
Figure 11 shows the main part of the entire network
structure of Sybil communities and overhyped stores, pruned
by a small portion of tiny networks. In the figure, a yellow
square represents a Sybil community, a red dot represents an
overhyped store, and an edge between a yellow and a red dot
represents that a Sybil community connects to an overhyped
store. As can be seen, almost all Sybil communities act as
central nodes. This indicates that these Sybil communities not
only launch campaigns for a single store, but also provide
various services for a huge number of overhyped stores who
are connected by the network. Furthermore, some overhyped
stores connect to multiple communities, which indicates that
they have employed Sybil communities more than once (A
case study is detailed in Section VI-F.). We also label chain
stores that have at least five branches with different colors
other than red. These chains are connected to the same
communities, respectively, possibly sharing similar reviews
and having the same goal.
D. Early Alerts for Sybil Campaigns
In this subsection, we will show that it is feasible to uncover
Sybil campaigns through monitoring our detected elite Sybil
users. In particular, by continually monitoring the collusive
Fig. 11. Relation between Sybil communities and the overhyped stores
behaviors of elite Sybil users, the social network operator can
determine whether a Sybil campaign has been launched at
the earliest stage, which serves as an early alert for a Sybil
campaign.
Detecting Sybil campaigns via monitoring elite Sybil users.
Our goal is to detect the presence of a Sybil campaign at the
early stage based on identifying elite Sybil users via contin-
ually monitoring all elite Sybil users. To do this, we simply
apply 7-day slide windows along the timeline to each store
so as to detect campaigns. The rule of determining a Sybil
campaign is more than a predetermined threshold number (e.g.,
7 in our experiment) of reviews that the elite Sybil users
posted at the same store within a 7-day slide window. Our
heuristic is that, in the non-campaign period, the elite Sybil
users normally post reviews at different stores in similar ways
as innocent users due to their different living habits, walking
routines, or shopping preferences. However, only within the
campaign period, the elite Sybil users collusively post reviews
at the same stores to fulfill the Sybil campaign tasks. The
evaluation results show that by scanning the activities of elite
Sybil users during the entire campaign period, approximately
90.40% campaigns can be determined. This indicates that the
campaign determination rule holds for almost all the Sybil
campaigns.
Determining Sybil campaigns at the early stage. An inter-
esting question is whether we can determine a Sybil campaign
at the early stage. The benefits of early detection is that it
can give a competitive advantage for the system operator
to take countermeasures against Sybil campaigns. We run
the campaign window determination algorithm by using the
first 1/4, 1/3, and 1/2 of the entire campaign period. The
evaluation results show that 56.77%, 63.08%, and 75.14%
of campaigns can be successfully detected correspondingly.
Since the average Sybil campaign period is 68 days in our
experiments, it indicates that more than 50% of Sybil cam-
paigns can be determined within the first two weeks by only
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Fig. 12. Reviews posted by Community 4559 in Store 4112200
Fig. 13. The distribution of number of campaigns across campaign duration
observing activities of elite Sybil users, thereby triggering
lightning strikes on Sybil campaigns.
E. Temporal Dynamics
We demonstrate two temporal dynamics characterized by
user posting period and Sybil campaign duration.
User posting period. Figure 12 shows that elite Sybil users
in Community 4559 repeatedly post fake reviews in Store
4112200. In the Figure, the x-axis shows the time when an
account posts a review, and the y-axis is the account’s ID.
A dot (x, y) in the figure represents that an account with
ID y posts a review at time x. We use staggered colors to
encode reviews posted by different users. As we can see from
Figure 12, 33 users in Community 4559 posted 127 reviews
within a period of two months. Posting reviews by these users
is much denser than by benign users. Apart from posting
reviews within a short time period, these elite Sybil users also
deliberately manipulate posting time of reviews. For example,
some elite Sybil users even periodically (every week/month)
post fake reviews. We emphasize that manipulation of posting
temporal dynamics is key to orchestrating the evasive strategy.
Sybil campaign duration. By applying the campaign window
detection algorithm, we finally obtain 4, 162 Sybil campaigns.
Figure 13 shows the distribution of number of campaigns
across campaign duration. As we can see from Figure 13, the
distribution is unimodal with a sudden spike at 7 days for the
x-axis, echoing our 7-day slide windows selected; then largely
monotonically decreasing beyond 50 days. More remarkably,
Fig. 14. Variation of star ratings and the number of reviews of a hotel
we observe there are 466 1-day ephemeral Sybil campaigns
as shown by the y-intercept of Figure 13. In these campaigns,
Sybil communities generally complete a task fleetingly.
In this section, we will detail a case study of Sybil commu-
nities and campaigns and illustrate various strategies to evade
the Dianping’s Sybil detection system.
F. Sybil Communities and Sybil Campaigns
Recall in Figure 11, we show a part of stores employ
several Sybil communities to increase their star ratings. Here,
we zoom in and show the first case study that is about a
hotel employing three different Sybil communities to post
fake reviews. Figure 14 shows that the variation of the star
rating and the number of reviews change over time. Orange
represents aggregate reviews of a hotel; blue, purple, and
green represent reviews coming from three respective Sybil
communities, respectively. The red line denotes the star rating
of a hotel and the blue line denotes the star rating without
detected fake reviews.
As we can see from Figure 14, many spikes occurred,
generated by three Sybil communities, always correspond to
the spike of the total number of reviews. This indicates that
these fake reviews causing sudden spikes are taken into effect
to raise the star rating of the hotel. In addition, as pointed out
from Figure 14, red and blue lines are overlapping before the
first spike; the red line then increases sharply afterwards but
the blue line maintains a moderate growth. This indicates that
these fake reviews posted by Sybil communities do have an
impact on distorting the online rating. Figure 14 also implies
that Community 7677 commits the largest-scale fake reviews
and contributes most to increasing the star rating. However,
Community 7668 launches a fairly long-term Sybil organiza-
tion but takes a very “moderate” gain on the star rating. This
is perhaps because the hotel has had accumulated a significant
number of reviews previously. Another possible reason is that
the secret ranking algorithm adopted by Dianping does not
merely depend on the average rating of a store. Features, such
as the number of reviews and the number of page views,
are another factors to determine the rank of a store. Hence,
although these reviews do not have a discernible impact on
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the average star rating, they may also affect ranking results on
Dianping.
G. Evading Dianping’s Sybil Detection System
In this case study, we present three examples of elite Sybil
users in the same community to attempt to illuminate the
evasive strategy taken by elite Sybil users. We also compare
the results processed by Dianping’s filtering system with ours.
(a) No reviews filtered
(b) Partial reviews filtered
(c) All reviews filtered
Fig. 15. Different detection results for elite Sybil users
As shown in Figure 15, each subfigure corresponds to the
reviews posted by each elite Sybil user. Each dot represents
a review posted according to the timeline; the upper (resp.
lower) dotted line of reviews represents the posting time-
line generated ELSIEDET (resp. Dianping filtering system).
In specific, each blue (resp. red) dot represents real (resp.
fake) reviews labeled by ELSIEDET. Each blue (resp. red)
triangle represents existing (resp. filtered) reviews according to
Dianping. Through these three examples, first, we can analyze
the evasive strategy taken by elite Sybil users. Elite Sybil users
will post massive reviews to camouflage fake reviews and this
strategy can evade most aggregate behavioral-based clustering
approaches that rely on computing similarity of user activity.
Second, these three users appear in the same community. They
write fake reviews in similar stores and share with the similar
behavioral patterns in the way to post reviews. However, there
is one distinct difference from Dianping filtering system. For
a given user, in Figure 15(a), we can see that no reviews
have been filtered; in Figure 15(b), partial reviews have been
filtered; in Figure 15(c), Sybil users are extremely sensitive
to Dianping filtering system as all reviews have been filtered.
This is perhaps because of his/her long negative-credit history.
In summary, we feel that Dianping filtering system is largely
working on detecting regular Sybils, as shown in Figure 15(b).
We feel that Dianping is being fairly opaque about its filtering
system as most of the real reviews of an elite Sybil user have
also been falsely filtered due to its high false alarm rate, as
shown in Figure 15(c). Although our dataset is moderate in
size compared with the Dianping database, it is large enough
to allow us to gain meaningful insights and identifying factors
that impact the results and limitations of conventional Sybil
detection systems.
VII. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
In this section, we discuss the potential application of
ELSIEDET and the limitations of the paper.
A. Application of ELSIEDET
We here show how ELSIEDET can be integrated to the
existing Dianping’s Sybil system to enhance its tolerance of
elite Sybil attacks.
Mitigating Sybil attacks by changing the weight of reviews
with respect to Sybilness. The ultimate goal of a Sybil
campaign is to manipulate the ratings of stores by generating
massive fake reviews and ratings. To mitigate the negative
impact of Sybil attacks on stores’ ranking, a potential approach
is to tune the weights of reviews of the suspicious users
according to their Sybilness. By assigning a lower weight
to a highly suspicious user, it will significantly increase the
difficulty of the Sybil organizations to manipulate the ratings
and help alleviate the human labor required to verify massive
number of users reported.
Monitoring the top elite Sybil users to predict Sybil
campaigns. Detecting Sybil campaigns is critical for Dianping
to limit the impact of Sybil attacks. In Section VI-D, we
have pointed out that we can monitor elite Sybil users and
exploit their group actions to identify the Sybil campaign in
a real-time fashion. Note that, considering millions of stores
and users, only monitoring a small set of suspicious users
can significantly save the efforts and resources of the social
network operators.
B. Limitations
First, although our detection system has strictly focused on
Dianping, our results are applicable to a wider range of URSNs
or any social media that relies on user-contributed comments.
Examples include E-commerce (Amazon, Ebay, BizRate),
movie-rating platforms (IMDB, Netflix, Douban), traveling
services (TripAdvisor), and multi-agent systems (Advogato).
In specific, in 2012, Yelp profile pages featured “consumer
alerts” on several sneaky businesses which got caught red-
handed trying to buy reviews, crafted by Yelp “elite” users,
for these businesses [36]. TripAdvisor has also put up similar
warning notices. These examples may have specific detection
systems, and we leave their design and evaluation to future
work. Second, we acknowledge if a Sybil community can
minimize the involvement in multiple campaigns, it would be
very likely to boost the chance to evade the detection; however,
recruiting high-cost elite Sybil users to participate in limited
Sybil campaigns contradicts the economic basis. Third, we do
not study the relationships among reviewers on Dianping. For
example, a reviewer can make friends and keep a friend list on
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Dianping. A reviewer can send a flower to another reviewer
in order to present a sense of complement to the reviewer
who posts a nice review. We think these social links among
reviewers are weak, extraneous for characterizing elite Sybil
users on Dianping. Instead, we exploit user-community as a
zoom lens to take a particular micro-macro analysis of elite
Sybil users without using any user profile information.
VIII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we survey the methodology used in previ-
ous research from four categories: graph-based approaches,
feature-based approaches, aggregate behavioral-based clus-
tering approaches, and crowdsourcing-based approaches. We
review each of these approaches as follows.
Graph-based approaches. Graph-based detection views ac-
counts as nodes and social links between accounts as edges.
For example, Liu et al. [26] considered the dynamic change
in the social graph. Much prior work [10, 18, 28] holds
the assumption that in a social graph, there exist a limited
number of attack edges connecting between benign and Sybil
users. The key insights behind this is that it becomes difficult
for attackers to set up links to real users, and strong trusts
are lacking in real OSNs, such as RenRen [47] and Face-
book [5, 8, 12, 22]. Souche [46] and Anti-Reconnaissance [31]
also rely on the assumption that social network structure
alone separates real users from Sybil users. Unfortunately,
this was proven unrealistic since real users refuse to interact
with unknown accounts [37]. Recent research [7] relaxes these
assumptions and takes a combined approach that first leverages
victim prediction to weigh the graph and upper bound the
aggregate weight on attack edges; then it performs a short
random walk on the weighted graph and distributes manually-
set scores to classify users. However, We argue that these
methods do not hold on URSNs and the nodes in URSNs
do not show a tight connectivity as those in general OSNs,
which renders the social network graph-connectivity-based
Sybil detection approaches less effective in URSNs.
Feature-based approaches. The advantage of behavioral pat-
terns is that these can be easily encoded in features and
adopted with machine learning techniques to learn the signa-
ture of user profiles and user-level activities. Different classes
of features are commonly employed to capture orthogonal
dimensions of users’ behaviors [13, 24, 32, 34, 35, 43].
Other work [33, 38, 39] considers the associated content
information, such as reviews context, wall posts, hashtags,
and URLs, to filter Sybil users. Specifically, the Facebook
immune system [35] detects Sybil users based on features
characterized from user profiles and activities. COMPA [13]
is designed to uncover compromised accounts via sudden
change alerts according to the behavioral patterns of users.
In addition to user profile, Song et al. [34] proposed a target-
based detection on Twitter approach which bases on features
of retweets. However, feature-based approaches are relatively
easy to circumvent by adversarial attacks [4, 9, 42, 51]. Further
work will also be needed to detect sophisticated strategies
exhibiting a mixture of realistic and Sybil users features.
Aggregate behavioral-based clustering approaches. Re-
cently, rather than classifying single users, much work [3, 11,
16, 29, 40, 43] focuses on detecting clusters of users. Specif-
ically, CopyCatch [3] and SynchroTrap [11], implementing
mixed approaches, score comparatively low false positive rates
with respect to single feature-based approaches. For Dianping,
the elite Sybil users, however, write elaborate reviews by
mimicking the real reviews and intentionally manipulate the
review temporal patterns within a Sybil campaign, so as to
change the behavior features to bypass detection.
Crowdsourcing-based approaches. Wang et al. [44] tested
the efficacy of crowdsourcing (such as leveraging humans,
both expert annotators, and workers hired online), at detect-
ing Sybil accounts simply from user profiles. The authors
observed that the detection rate for hired workers drops off
over time, although majority voting can compensate for the
loss. However, two drawbacks undermine the feasibility of
this approach: (i) This solution might not be cost effective
for large-scale networks, such as Facebook and Dianping;
(ii) exposing personal information to external workers raises
privacy issue [14]. We observe that some recent work dis-
cusses how to identify the regular Sybil users in URSNs
(e.g., Yelp and Dianping) by exploiting crowdsourcing-based
approaches [23, 32, 34], or model-based detection [25] that
limits their broad applicability. Most recent work leverages
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) to automate the genera-
tion of synthetic Yelp reviews [48]. However, we emphasize
that ELSIEDET is immune to the AI attack for two reasons: (i)
ELSIEDET does not accommodate any contextual features that
RNN-based attack is centered around. (ii) The attack dataset
used in [48] does not take in any human-crafted fake reviews,
which presumes that the proposed defense [48] cannot well
identify the fake reviews written by elite Sybil users defined
in our paper. We believe that our research is the first to define,
characterize, and perform a large-scale empirical measurement
study toward the elite Sybil attack in URSNs. We thus hope
that our results may serve as a supplement to other traditional
Sybil detection schemes and shed light on the novel Sybil
detection system for uncovering other evolved Sybil users.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper illuminates the threat of large-scale Sybil activ-
ities in User-Review Social Networks. We first demonstrated
that Sybil organizations of Dianping utilize a hybrid cascading
hierarchy to orchestrate campaigns. An in-depth analysis of
elite Sybil users leads us to several important conclusions:
elite Sybil users are more spread out temporally, craft better-
edited contents, but have fewer reviews filtered. We showed
that most Sybil campaigns can be determined within the first
two weeks by only monitoring detected elite Sybil users.
Strikingly, we also showed that a series of chains leverage
Sybil organizations to distort the online rating, rendering
previous research outdated. We emphasize that sophisticated
manipulation of temporal patterns is key to orchestrating the
evasive strategy. Finally, we demonstrated that ELSIEDET is
both highly effective and scalable as a standalone system.
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Although our study and experiments focus on Dianping,
we believe that the anti-Sybil defense as examined in this
paper provides an opportunity for all URSNs to stop the spread
of elite Sybil users in a way that has never been visible on
Dianping or other social networks like it.
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